Republic of the Philippines
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Sixth Judicial Region
Branch 10
San Jose, Antique
FRANCIS GIDEON L. JAVIER, ET. AL.,
Plaintiffs,
– versus –
HON. ANTONIO CERILES, in his capacity
As the SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, ET. AL.,
Defendants.
Civil Case No. 2000-12-3221
For:
INJUNCTION WITH
PRAYER FOR A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – x
O R D E R
The ORDER dated December 29, 2000 temporarily restrained the defendants, for or within a seventy-two hour period, from dumping garbage coming from Metro Manila into or at Unong Pit or any other area in Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique. It was issued ex parte by this Court through the Executive Judge explicitly because it appears from the allegations of the verified complaint that the subject matter of this case is of extreme urgency and it involves the right to a balanced and healthful ecology and a reasonably perceived impairment of the environment.
Conformably with Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prior and due notice to all the defendants who were all represented yesterday, January 2, 2001, by their respective counsels, namely: Atty. Manuel Gaite, Atty. Cornelio Aldon, Atty. Violeta Seva, Atty. Roel Pacio, and Atty. Jerome Canlas, and also to the plaintiffs on whose behalf appeared Atty. Robin Rubinos, the present case was regularly raffled to Branch 10 of this Court, presided by Hon. Sylvia G. Jurao who is, however, still on leave of absence.Thus, the undersigned pairing judge conducted a summary hearing, precisely to determine whether or not the temporary restraining order heretofore issued should be extended for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days including the original seventy-two (72) hours provided therein.
The plaintiffs, through Atty. Robin Rubinos, asserted that the temporary restraining order be extended generally on the ground that there is urgency therefor and so that no grave injustice or irreparable damage might be sustained by the plaintiffs and the people of Antique. With more particularity, the plaintiffs submitted that on the strength of Annexes “M” and “N” to their complaint, there is reasonable bases to conclude that the dumping in Semirara Island of garbage coming from Metro Manila will pollute the environment in Antique; that such dumping of garbage would be violative of the Constitutional right of the plaintiffs to a healthful environment and a balanced ecology; and, that such dumping of garbage has no support from, but is vehemently opposed by, the Sangguniang Bayan of Caluya, Antique and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Antique, as per resolutions of the respective sangguniangs attached as Annexes “E” and “L” to the complaint.The plaintiffs also decried the fact that there has been no public hearing to evaluate the environmental impact of the project, even as no Environmental Compliance Certificate therefor has been issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Atty. Manuel Gaite, relying on R.A. No. 8975, eloquently advanced arguments focused on the theory of want of jurisdiction of this Court, except the Supreme Court, to issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction involving certain acts subject of a national government project or contract, and that any such order or writ so issued is void. The other counsel for the other defendants adopted Atty. Manuel Gaite’s arguments, and Atty. Cornelio Aldon added that there is no urgency in the present case because the waste management project has not yet been started and it is premature to say that it will adversely affect Antique, and that the studies conducted in the United States, Annexes “M” and “N” to the complaint, express mere opinions of authors who have not been shown as experts and whose opinions are not necessarily applicable locally. Moreover, he said that in a resolution (Exh. “1”), the Sangguniang Barangay of Semirara favorably indorsed the project.
Atty. Robin Rubinos then stressed that the act the plaintiffs seek to be restrained is the dumping in Semirara Island of garbage coming from Metro Manila, which is not an infrastructure project contemplated under the prohibitory clause of R.A. No. 8975 which, in Section 3 thereof, nonetheless provides for exceptions.
Upon clarificatory queries by this Court, Atty. Cornelio Aldon disclosed that the contemplated waste management project does not involve an open dumpsite, but a sanitary landfill under a waste management system where the site has plastic or clay membrane liners, and there are pipes and ponds for collection of leachate and gas. He also revealed that the contract for sanitary landfill between MMDA and DMCI and R-II BUILDERS has passed the final stage of negotiations thereby implying that no contract has as yet been perfected. On the other hand, Atty. Manuel Gaite conceded that no Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) has been issued for the waste management project which involves the environment, but there is an Environmental Plan which may mitigate the project’s adverse effects on the environment and, in the process, may ripen into an Environmental Compliance Certificate. Queried by this Court, Atty. Manuel Gaite agreed that the contemplated waste management project certainly involves the environment and the petitioners’ or complainants’ right to a balance ecology or healthful environment.
The parties then agreed to submit for resolution by this Court the question of whether or not the temporary restraining order heretofore issued be extended.
However, today, January 3, 2001, while this Order was being written this Court received an OPPOSITION (to the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated January 2, 2001, which the Solicitor General filed as counsel for the public respondents/defendants contending that the petition or complaint is proscribed by P.D. No. 1818, R.A. No. 8975 and SC ADM. CIR. NO. 11-2000, that the petitioners or plaintiffs lack legal standing who, furthermore, have not sufficiently alleged grave and irreparable injury.
This order, therefore, will treat the issues that the parties brought forth orally in open court as well as those put down in writing in the OPPOSITION dated January 2, 2001. After a patient review of the allegations of the complaint, and a careful consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court is more inclined to extend the efficacy of the temporary restraining order for a period not exceeding twenty (20) days including the original seventy-two (72) hours granted in the ORDER dated December 29,2000.
I
The respondents’ submission in their OPPOSITION dated January 2, 2000 that the petitioners’ or complaints’ petition or complaint is proscribed by P.D. No. 1818, R.A. No. 8975 and Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, does not deserve concurrence.
It is true that under Section 1, P.D. No. 1818 and Section 3, R.A. No. 8975 quoted in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, there is a prohibition on the issuance by a court of any temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the acts thereunder enumerated which involve a national government infrastructure project or service contract. But the said prohibition, just like any rule, admits of certain exceptions, Thus, Section 3, R.A. No. 8975 expressly provides that the “prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave injustice or irreparable injury will arise.” (Ibid. Underscoring supplied).
That the matter subject of the petition or complaint involves a constitutional issue is a foregone conclusion because the petitioners or complainants allege in their verified COMPLAINT dated December 21, 2000 that they and the people of Antique ” are entitled to the full benefit of living in a balanced and healthy environment”, but that the dumping in Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique of garbage coming from Metro Manila “would ultimately produce the destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity and eventually, to its complete eradication not only in the Island of Semirara, Caluya, Antique along the entire shoreline of Antique” and the neighboring provinces (Ibid. Pars. 11 and 12). More importantly, during the summary hearing on January 2, 2001, Atty. Manuel Gaite — counsel of one of the defendants or respondents whose manifestations were adopted by other counsel — agreed that the contemplated waste management project certainly involves the environment and the petitioners’ or complainants’ right to a balanced ecology and healthful environment.
It is, thus, evident that the herein petitioners or complainants hinge their plaint on their right ” to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature” as provided for under Section 16, Article II, Constitution. In a similar factual situation, a case was viewed as one with a “special and novel element”, based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the “right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned” which considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” and which, in turn, includes the judicious utilization of the country’s waters, fisheries and other natural resources (Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792, 802-803). More significantly, it was also pronounced in the same case that “(T)he right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.” (Ibid. 224 SCRA 792, 805). Verily, the dumping by the defendants or respondents in Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique, of garbage coming from Metro Manila appears to be a material and substantial invasion of the plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is constitutionally guaranteed which, if not judicially restrained, would most probably cause incalculable damage to the environment. In view thereof, there is hardly any doubt that the obtaining circumstances take away the present case from the prohibition on the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, and places the same squarely within the ambit of the excepting clause of Section 3, R.A. No. 8975.
In the final analysis, there is in the present case a clash between the statutory protection of the defendants’ or respondents’ right to an unhampered prosecution or implementation of a national government project or contract, and the plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ constitutionally mandated right to a balanced and healthful ecology. If the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order or the extension of its efficacy to a period not exceeding twenty (20) days is a case primae impressionis in the light of R.A. No. 8975, it is no more or less for the reason that in the hierarchy of rights, it is the right enshrined in the Constitution that must be preferred over that which emanates merely from legislation.
From another perspective, the ultimate effect of the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order and the extension of its life to a full twenty- day period, is not so much to stave off the defendants’ or the respondents’ prosecution or implementation of a national government project or contract as to accord the plaintiffs or petitioners a meaningful enjoyment of their primordial right to a sound environment.
There are then good and sound reasons for this Court to believe without equivocation or mental reservation that it may legally issue a temporary restraining order and extend the life thereof to a period not exceeding twenty (20) days, or until the application for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard, by way of exception to the general rule under Section 3, R.A. No. 8975.
II
The defendants or respondents next postulate, in their OPPOSITION dated January 2, 2001 that the plaintiffs or petitioners ” have no personality to sue” even as taxpayers because “the Semirara Landfill Project does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing and spending powers”, and that “a taxpayer’s suit may be sustained only when the act complained of directly involves an illegal disbursement of public funds raised by taxation”, but that all they say is that they “are entitled to the full benefit of living in a balanced and healthy environment free from any form of environmental hazards caused by man,” which is a general averment “grossly insufficient to clothe petitioners with standing.” This Court cannot subscribe to the foregoing.
For one reason or another, the defendants or respondents have omitted to state that in paragraph one (1) of the COMPLAINT dated December 21, 2000, the plaintiffs or petitioners expressly aver that “this is a taxpayer’s suit because the acts of the defendants sought to be enjoined in this case would involve expenditure of public funds in bringing garbage from Metro Manila to Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique”. This averment, considered with the plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ other allegations that the defendants’ or respondents’ acts complained of is violative of the right of the former to a balanced and healthful ecology, ineluctably compels this Court to hold that the plaintiffs or the petitioners have satisfactorily alleged facts which show that they have sufficient interest as to have legal standing before this Court to seek an injunctive remedy against the impairment of their right to a sound environment. Indeed, a taxpayer can bring an action to restrain an unlawful disbursement of public funds (Galarosa vs. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728) which, in the present case, would come in the consequent payment by the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and/or the Greater Metro Manila Waste Management Committee for the dumping in Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique of garbage coming from Metro Manila, which the defendants or respondents so vehemently insisted during the summary hearing on January 2, 2001 as either a national government infrastructure project or a service contract. It need not be overemphasized that the prosecution or implementation of a national government infrastructure project or service contract necessarily entails the disbursement of public funds, and is a matter which is of public knowledge or is capable of unquestionable demonstration and of which this Court takes judicial notice.
It is worth recalling the aforecited case of Oposa vs, Factoran, Jr. where the “complaint was instituted as a taxpayers’ suit” (224 SCRA 792,796) and, as already underscored earlier, where the allegations of facts are similar, if not identical, to those averred in the present case. In the said case, it was held that the plaintiffs or petitioners — minors, at that — “can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue… can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. ” So was it in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., so must it be in the present case, that is, that the herein plaintiffs or petitioners have locus standi.
III
In their OPPOSITION dated January 2, 2001, the defendants or respondents likewise posit that the plaintiffs or petitioners have not sufficiently alleged grave and irreparable injury, because the complaint sets forth nothing but general allegations of the injury caused or to be caused by the acts of the defendants or respondents which are, therefore, insufficient to justify the issuance of a restraining order or injunctive writ. They then argue that “(P)etitioners may not leave their proofs in such shape that a reasonable doubt remains, for as has so often been said, to doubt is to deny.” This stance of the defendants or respondents is unpersuasive.
This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that there are only two requisites for an injunctive writ to issue: (1) the existence of a right in esse of the petitioner or plaintiff which must be protected; and (2) the act complained of is a violation of such right (Cagayan de Oro City Landless Residents Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 200). Gauged against the foregoing requisites, it is well to note the plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ allegations in the COMPLAINT dated December 21, 2000, and more pertinently those substantially quoting Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows:
“(a) that the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs demanded and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act/acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) that the commission of the act/acts complained of during the litigation would work injustice to the plaintiffs considering the far reaching effects of the pollution of the environment in the area where the garbage is proposed to be dumped;
(c) that the defendants collectively or any of the defendants individually are foing (sic), threatening or are attempting to do or are procuring or suffering to be done some act/acts in the violation of the rights of the plaintiffs respecting the subject of the action which is to prevent them from dumping garbage from Metro Manila to Semirara Island, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.” (Ibid. Underscoring supplied).
This Court cannot quite see how the plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ material allegations and, with specificity, that about “the far-reaching effects of the pollution of the environment” as may result from the dumping in Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique of garbage coming from Metro Manila can be categorized as “general averments” by the defendants or respondents. Quite contrarily, the same allegations convey to this Court the import of grave and irreparable injury that may be occasioned to the plaintiffs or petitioners if the act complained of were not in the meantime restrained. Such allegations, which are verified, by themselves, engender reasonable and sufficient bases under the rules for this Court to temporarily restrain the threatened dumping of garbage without need for the plaintiffs or petitioners to show evidence of such alleged facts at this stage of the proceeding (Sec. 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure). As a matter of fact, even in the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction — – a stage that ensues after the issuance of a temporary restraining order has been dealt with — the Court considers nothing more than initial or incomplete evidence, and makes findings which are merely interlocutory (La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 498). Thus, at this point, the defendants’ or respondents’ argument that “(P)etitioners may not leave their proofs in such shape that a reasonable doubt remains, for as has so often been said, to doubt is to deny”, is utterly misplaced.
IV
The conclusions arrived at by this Court are subserved by the uncontroverted fact, admitted by the defendants or respondents through Atty. Manuel Gaite, that no Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) has been issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for the waste management project which involves the environment. There is thus an apparent obliviousness on the part of the defendants or respondents to even priorly procure what is fundamentally required (Executive Order No. 192 dated June 10, 1987; DENR Administrative Order No. 96-37) for such an undertaking which would have transcendental effects on the right to a sound environment which belongs not only to the plaintiffs or petitioners but also to their children and children’s children.
It matters not that the Sangguniang Barangay of Semirara has passed a resolution (Exh. “1”) supporting the waste management project, for it cannot be gainsaid that, on the other hand, the Sangguniang Bayan of Caluya, Antique and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Antique separately passed resolutions (Annexes “E” and “L”, COMPLAINT dated December 21, 2000) in strong opposition to the same project. This explains why, as conceded by Atty. Manuel Gaite, no Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) has been obtained for the project, because under applicable rules and regulations (DENR Administrative Order No. 96-37; Executive Order No. 192 dated June 10, 1987) a scoping or series of meetings, which must be documented, are indispensable steps to the issuance of such certificate, so that the local government units concerned must expressly give imprimatur to such kind of project in which every kindred soul has a stake. This is specially so that under Executive Order No. 542 dated June 26, 1979, as amended, Caluya, Antique has been declared and established as a Marine Turtle Sanctuary and, thereby, withdrawn from exploitation (See also MNR Administrative Order No. 34 dated June 21, 1982; MNR Administrative Order No. 08, dated June 8, 1982) and, by the same token, Caluya, Antique is an environmentally critical area (DENR Administrative Order No. 96-37). This means, emphatically, that Caluya, Antique is ecologically, socially or geologically sensitive from the legal and other viewpoints.
The lack of urgency which Atty. Cornelio Aldon underscored is a matter of his own perception which he obviously ties up with his disclosure that the contract for sanitary landfill between MMDA and DMCI and R-II BUILDERS has passed the final stage of negotiations, thereby implying that no contract has as yet been perfected. This disclosure, made in open court during the summary hearing on January 2, 2001, suffers from inadequate candidness because in the OPPOSITION dated January 2, 2001 of the public respondents or defendants it is categorically represented that “petitioners are suing to prevent the enforcement of obligations under a contract that has been entered into between the government and respondents DMCI, Celdex/ R- II Builders Consortium” (Ibid.P.5.Underscoring supplied). This is not to say that one or the other defendants or respondents are before this Court with unclean hands as to a germane fact for, it that were so, none of their words deserves to be listened to.
But, whether the waste management contract between MMDA and DMCI and R-II BUILDERS has only passed the final stage of negotiations, or it has in fact been perfected, is really beside the point. One or the other evinces a certainty that, at any moment, what the plaintiffs or petitioners dread — the dumping in Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique of garbage coming from Metro Manila, and the specter of havoc to the ecologically, socially or geologically sensitive environment of Caluya, Antique it can bring about — would come to pass.
Time ought to be a benefactor, not a stealthy foe, to the herein plaintiffs or petitioners. And as they have come before this Court for relief while yet there is such time, and before the act complained of has been commenced by the defendants or respondents, this Court is constrained to accord the plaintiffs or petitioners that relief, here and now. Afterall, it is beyond debate that what can be restrained only is an act which has not yet been done (Rivera vs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 658). And, moreover, such a course of action by this Court results to nothing else than the preservation of the status quo, the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which preceded the present action (Versoza vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 100), until the case can be heard on the merits.
A word more. While this order is dictated by circumstances of the present, it looks to the future. The natural resources of Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique, nay, of the entire country and the whole world, are gifts from the Divine Architect. It is a bounden duty for the people to cherish and to protect these natural resources now and in the years ahead. This Court can do no less.Otherwise, the day will arrive when from our nerveless grasps shall drop forever the boundless bounties of these that sustain life. By then there would be no garbage to speak of, nor a dumpsite to quarrel about, as everyone would have come to the end of their toilsome and earthly journey. So mote it be!
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, until such time that the plaintiffs’ or petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard, the defendants or respondents HON. ANTONIO CERILES, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY, SEC. ROBERT AVENTAJADO, DMCI/CELDEX/R-II BUILDERS, and/or DAVID M. CONSUNJI, and all other persons acting in their behalf, direction or authority, are temporarily restrained for an extended period not exceeding twenty (20) days including the original seventy-two (72) hours subject of the ORDER dated December 29, 2000, or until January 18, 2001, from dumping garbage coming from Metro Manila into or at Unong Pit or any other area at Semirara Island, Caluya, Antique.
Furnish copies of this order to the Solicitor General, and to Attorneys Manuel Gaite, C ornelio Aldon, Violeta Seva, Roel Pacio, Jerome Canlas, and Robin Rubinos.
SO ORDERED.
San Jose, Antique, Philippines, January 3, 2001.
Source: Courtesy of ANTIQUEdotPH
Link: http://www.antique/news/order.html
